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This lecture examines the causes of the global financial crisis, showing it was
triggered by market failures, not by financial institution failures, and arguing that any
regulatory framework for managing systemic risk must address markets as well as
institutions. The lecture also analyzes how regulation should be designed under that
broader framework to mitigate systemic risk and its consequences. Finally, the lecture
examines the potential systemic effects of sovereign debt crises, demonstrating how
regulation
can
mitigate
those
effects.
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INTRODUCTION
Although banks and other financial institutions are important sources of
capital, and although a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol
of systemic risk, the ongoing trend towards disintermediation—or enabling
companies to access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets,
without going through banks or other financial intermediaries—is making
these failures less critical than in the past. Companies today are able to
obtain most of their financing through the capital markets without the use of
intermediaries. As a result, capital markets themselves are increasingly
central to any examination of systemic risk. Systemic disturbances can erupt
outside the banking system and spread through capital-market linkages,
rather than merely through banking relationships.

This has been dramatically illustrated by the global financial crisis.
Although many think the crisis started with the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers, the initial trigger was the collapse of the market for mortgagebacked securities. A significant number of these securities were backed by
subprime (or risky) home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced
through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the
borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted.

These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts of investment-grade
rated securities backed by these mortgages to be downgraded and, in some
cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these and other rated
securities, and their market prices started falling.
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Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed
securities, was particularly exposed. Firms that had been doing business with
Lehman—its „counterparties‟—began demanding additional safeguards,
which Lehman could not provide. As a result, absent a bailout, Lehman
could not continue doing business.

The refusal of the U.S. Government to save Lehman Brothers, and
Lehman‟s resulting bankruptcy, added to this cascade. Securities markets
became so panicked that even the short-term commercial paper market
virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities
collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage assets
underlying those securities. {Give example of July 2008 Orion Finance SIV
case in English High Court of Justice, in which I was an expert. Its
mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents/dollar,
whereas the present value of its reasonably-expected cash flows would yield
a value around 88 cents/dollar.}

The cascade became a death spiral as banks and other financial
institutions holding mortgage-backed securities had to write down their
value under mark-to-market accounting rules, causing these institutions to
appear more financially risky, in turn triggering widespread concern over
counterparty risk. The high leverage of many firms, which effectively
required fire-sales of assets, exacerbated the fall.

Although governments have taken numerous steps to address the
collapse, most of those steps have focused on institutions, not markets. Such
a narrow focus worked well when banks and institutions were the primary
Leverhulme Lecture-The Global Financial Crisis and Systemc Risk FINAL.DOC

4

source of corporate financing. But as the financial crisis reveals, this focus is
insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly
through capital markets.

I believe that institutional systemic risk and market systemic risk should
not be viewed each in isolation. Institutions and markets can both be triggers
and transmitters of systemic risk.

ANALYSIS

How should we regulate systemic risk? This is a subset of the problem
of regulating financial risk. Scholars argue that the primary if not sole
justification for regulating financial risk is maximizing economic efficiency.
Because systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a
central goal in its regulation.

Efficiency, however, has a somewhat unique added dimension in the
context of systemic risk. Without regulation, the externalities caused by
systemic risk would not be prevented or internalized because systemic risk
pertains to risks to the financial system itself. Market participants are
motivated to protect themselves but not necessarily to protect the system as a
whole.
As a result, there is a type of “tragedy of the commons,” a collective
action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources
accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to
maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which
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affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of
persons. Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not only on
traditional efficiency but also on stability of the financial system.

In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also
take into account the costs of regulation. There are direct costs, such as
hiring government employees to monitor and enforce the regulations. But
more importantly there can be indirect costs, such as overregulation that
stifles innovation and competitiveness.

Subject to that caveat, consider the following possible regulatory
approaches.

Averting Panics. The ideal regulatory approach would aim to
eliminate the risk of systemic collapse from the outset. Theoretically this
goal could be achieved by preventing financial panics, since they are often
the triggers that commence a chain of failures. The global financial crisis
itself, for example, was initially triggered by financial market panic. Any
regulation aimed at preventing panics that trigger systemic risk, however,
could fail to anticipate all the causes of the panics. Furthermore, even when
identified, panics cannot always be averted easily because investors are not
always rational.

Requiring Increased Disclosure. Another potential regulatory
approach is to improve disclosure. Disclosing risks traditionally has been
viewed, at least under U.S. and most foreign securities laws, as the primary
market-regulatory mechanism. It works by reducing, if not eliminating,
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asymmetric information among market players, making the risks transparent
to all.

In the context of systemic risk, however, individual market
participants who fully understand that risk will be motivated to protect
themselves but not the system as a whole.

Furthermore, the efficacy of disclosure is limited by the increasing
complexity of transactions and markets—complexity being, I believe, the
greatest 21st Century challenge for our financial system. In the recent
financial crisis, for example, there is little question that virtually everything
was disclosed regarding the complex mortgage-backed securities. Yet many
institutional investors bought these securities based primarily on their
ratings, without fully understanding them.

There are a host of reasons why this occurred. (i) Analysts overrelied
on heuristics such as rating-agency ratings. (ii) Analysts and investors
followed the herd in their investment choices. (iii) Conflicts of interest were
driven by short-term management compensation schemes, especially for
technically sophisticated secondary managers (and tomorrow I‟ll discuss
how mathematical modeling, like value-at-risk (VaR), contributed to this);
this is a conflict unlike the traditional focus of scholars and politicians on
conflicts between senior managers and shareholders. (iv) The retention by
underwriters of residual risk portions may have fostered false confidence in
buyers, in effect creating a mutual misunderstanding; this could be
exacerbated in the future by the political solution that sellers retain a
minimum unhedged position in each class of securities they sell.
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Requiring increased disclosure would therefore do little to reduce
systemic risk. We should, however, address the conflicts of interest that are
inherent in short-term compensation structures, especially of secondary
managers.

Imposing Financial-Exposure Limits. The failure of one or more
large institutions could create defaults large enough to de-stabilize other
highly-leveraged investors, increasing the likelihood of a systemic market
meltdown. This suggests another possible approach to regulation: placing
limits on an institution‟s financial exposure.

These limits could be imposed in various ways, such as (i) limiting an
institution‟s leverage; (ii) limiting an institution‟s right to make risky
investments, such as the so-called Volker Rule‟s proposal to limit
proprietary trading; and (iii) limiting amounts of inter-institution exposure.
Consider each in turn.
(i) Limiting an institution‟s leverage could reduce the risk that an
institution fails in the first place. It also could reduce the likelihood of
transmitting financial contagion between institutions. But limiting leverage
can create significant costs. Some leverage is good, and there is no optimal
across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every institution.
(ii) Limiting an institution‟s right to make investments is a highly
paternalistic approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a
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firm‟s own business judgment. In general, I would be highly skeptical of any
rule that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial institution from itself.

(iii) Inter-institution financial-exposure limits would facilitate stability
by diversifying risk, in effect by reducing the losses of any given contractual
counterparty and thus the likelihood that such losses would cause the
counterparty to fail. Limits also might reduce the urgency, and hence the
panic, that contractual counterparties feel about closing out their positions.

This approach already applies to banks through lending limits, which
restrict the amount of bank exposure to any given customer‟s risk. Its
application beyond banks to other financial institutions is potentially
appealing given the increasing blurring of lines between banks and non-bank
financial institutions and the high volumes of financial assets circulating
among non-bank financial entities.

It is questionable, though, whether the government should impose
financial exposure limits on institutions. Large financial institutions already
try to protect themselves through risk management and risk mitigation. The
financial crisis has raised questions, though, whether conflicts of interest
among managers and other failures can undermine institutional risk
management.

Limiting Financial Institution Size. This is related to financial
exposure limits; but here there is also the moral-hazard potential that
institutions who believe they are “too big to fail” will engage in risky
projects. There is, however, no clear evidence of such risky behavior, and
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financial institutional losses in the global financial crisis can all be explained
by other reasons. (I later argue that a privately-funded systemic risk fund can
minimize even the potential for such risky behavior.)

I would caution against artificially limiting financial institution size.
Size should be governed by the economies of scale and scope needed for
institutions to successfully compete, domestically and abroad—so long as
that size is manageable. We should watch out, however, for institutions that
increase their size, especially by acquisition of other institutions, primarily
to satisfy senior management egos. That is yet another reason why
management compensation should, ideally, be tied to long-term results.

Ensuring Liquidity. Ensuring liquidity could facilitate stability in two
ways: by providing liquidity to prevent financial institutions from defaulting,
and by providing liquidity to capital markets as necessary to keep them
functioning.

In the United States, the Federal Reserve Bank has had the role of
providing liquidity to prevent financial institutions from defaulting, by
acting as a lender of last resort. Acting as a lender of last resort to
institutions can be costly, however. By providing a lifeline, a lender of last
resort can at least theoretically foster moral hazard by encouraging financial
institutions—especially those that believe they are “too big to fail”—to be
fiscally reckless. It also can shift costs to taxpayers since loans made to
institutions will not be repaid if the institutions eventually fail. For these
reasons, the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S. sharply limits the power of the
Federal Reserve to make emergency loans to individual or insolvent
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financial institutions. I regard that categorical limitation as perverse; a lender
of last resort can be an important safeguard if used judiciously.

Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial
institutions, the global financial crisis has shown that, in an era of
disintermediation, more attention needs to be focused on providing liquidity
to capital markets as necessary to keep them functioning. This approach
should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A market liquidity
provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market panic, can
profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and
still provide a “floor” to how low the market will drop. Buying at a deep
discount will mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market
liquidity provider will be repaid.

One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can
invest at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private
investors won‟t also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of
governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at
investing firms will not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by
causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned
the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and
sell securities, not waiting for their maturities, whereas a market liquidity
provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary.

Ad Hoc Approaches. The cost and effectiveness of ad hoc, or purely
reactive, regulatory responses to systemic risk are, of course, partly
dependent on what those responses turn out to be. Ad hoc approaches do not
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always work. Sometimes they are too late and the harm has been done or no
longer can be prevented, and sometimes there is insufficient time to fashion
and implement an optimal solution.

But ad hoc approaches should not be dismissed out of hand. They can
help to minimize the difficulties in measuring, and balancing, costs and
benefits; and they can reduce moral-hazard cost to the extent an institution
cannot know in advance whether, if it faces financial failure, it will be bailed
out or fail.

Market Discipline. Under a market-discipline approach, the
regulator‟s job is to ensure that market participants exercise the type of
diligence that enables the market to work efficiently. This was the type of
approach taken by the United States government under the second Bush
administration.

Textbooks claim that perfect markets would never need external
regulation, thereby providing support for a market-discipline approach.
However actual markets, including financial markets, are not perfect.
Furthermore, as illustrated by the tragedy of the commons, a firm can lack
sufficient incentive to limit its risk taking in order to reduce the danger of
systemic contagion for other firms.

The financial crisis dramatically confirms that market discipline alone
cannot always prevent systemic risk.

RECOMMENDATIONS
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Of the regulatory approaches identified so far, I would recommend at
least two: ensure that managers (including secondary managers) of financial
institutions are compensated based on long-term firm performance; and
establish a market liquidity provider of last resort.

Let me expand on the latter recommendation. A market liquidity
provider of last resort would have the best chance of minimizing a systemic
collapse under any number of circumstances. But to be successful, it must be
made operational in advance of a market collapse, which can occur rapidly
and without warning.

Chaos theory supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of
last resort. In complex engineering systems, failures are inevitable.
Therefore modularity is needed to break the transmission of these failures
and limit their systemic consequences. Such a mechanism usually exists for
banks (a liquidity provider of last resort); we also need one for complex
financial markets.

Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a
market liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the
commercial paper market, the U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as a lender of last resort for that
market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity distortions” by
purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not
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otherwise sell their paper.2 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the
commercial paper market.3

I also would recommend a third regulatory approach: in response to
the tragedy-of-the-commons problem, to require financial institutions of
systemic significance to contribute to a fund that would be used to mitigate
systemic externalities—such as by funding the market liquidity provider or
providing bank bailout monies. This approach was originally in the DoddFrank Act, but it was taken out at the last minute because of opposition by
politicians who believed (in my opinion, wrongly) that it would increase
moral hazard by institutionalizing bailouts.

A privately-funded systemic risk fund not only can mitigate systemic
externalities but also can help minimize the potential for risky behavior
caused by institutions that believe they are too big to fail. The too-big-to-fail
problem is effectively an externality imposed on government (and ultimately
taxpayers) by an institution engaging in such risky behavior. A privatelyfunded systemic risk fund would help to internalize that externality.
Furthermore, the ability of government to require additional contributions to
this type of fund should motivate contributors to the fund to monitor each
other to reduce the potential for such risky behavior.

Recently, the European Commission has been toying with the idea of
a systemic risk fund in connection with its proposal to tax the financial

2

See Tobias Adrian, Karin Kimbrough, & Dina Marchioni, „The Federal Reserve‟s
Commercial Paper Funding Facility,” FRBNY Econ. Policy Rev. (forthcoming).
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sector. Although the ultimate use of the tax revenues is currently unresolved,
news reports indicate that an originally contemplated use was a systemic risk
fund. The IMF also appears to be using the European Commission tax
proposal as a platform to announce that „new taxes on banks [are] needed to
provide an insurance fund for future financial meltdowns and to curb
excessive risktaking.‟4

INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS

Because financial markets and institutions increasingly cross
sovereign borders, any regulatory approaches must be designed to work in
an international context. We should consider (a) the feasibility of
internationally regulating systemic risk, (b) the extent to which a market
liquidity provider of last resort or other regulatory solutions are universal or
should be different for different countries, and (c) the potential for a
regulatory race to the bottom, international regulatory arbitrage, or even
undermining national competitiveness if regulation is done only on a
national level. For example, the European Commission recognizes that to
avoid making the EU financial sector uncompetitive, any tax on the financial
sector should be applied in all financial centres.

SOVEREIGN DEBT ISSUES RELATING TO SYSTEMIC RISK

3

Id. at 11 (concluding that “[t]he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial
paper market”).
4
Larry Elliott & Jill Treanor, IMF: Supervise and Tax Banks or Risk Crisis, THE
GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2010, at 25 (London-final ed.) (paraphrasing an announcement by
IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn).
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Any discussion of the global financial crisis and systemic risk should
also address the problem of sovereign debt restructuring. Even relatively
small nations, like Greece, can be seen as too big to fail if their default could
trigger wider economic collapse. As a result, they are often bailed out.

Bailouts can foster true moral hazard because nations, unlike financial
institutions, cannot be liquidated, and governments have strong political
incentives to avoid reducing services or raising taxes. The Greek
government, for example, did little to impose fiscal austerity even as debts
accumulated. Furthermore, bailouts are terribly expensive—in the case of
Greece costing potentially hundreds of billions of euros.

This is a growing problem: as global capital markets increasingly (and
inevitably) embrace sovereign bonds, the potential for a country‟s debt
default to trigger a larger systemic collapse becomes even more tightly
linked.
The alternative to a bailout is an orderly debt restructuring, but that‟s
usually impractical because of two market failures: a holdout problem, and a
funding problem. The holdout problem is that any given creditor has an
incentive to strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debtrestructuring plan, hoping that the imperative of others to settle will
persuade them to allocate the holdout more than its fair share of the
settlement or purchase the holdout‟s claim.5 The funding problem is that a

5

This problem was playfully illustrated in the 1999 British movie, Waking Ned Devine.
Devine, an elderly man in a remote Irish village, wins the national lottery but
immediately dies of shock (without heirs). The townspeople want to have one of their
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country is likely to need to borrow new money to pay critical expenses
during the debt restructuring process but no lender is likely to be willing to
lend such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over existing debt
claims. Any effective solution to the sovereign debt dilemma would have to
address these two problems.

Addressing the Holdout Problem
The holdout problem can be addressed by legislating, through
international treaty, a form of “super-majority” voting on sovereign debtrestructuring plans, in which the vote by the overwhelming majority of
similarly situated creditors can bind dissenting creditors. This is the triedand-true method by which insolvency law, including Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, successfully and equitably addresses the holdout problem
in a corporate context and achieves consensual debt restructuring. Because
only similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors, and
because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors alike, the
outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of holdouts and dissenters as
much as the claims of the super-majority.

The IMF actually proposed, some years back, a sovereign debt
restructuring convention similar to this, based on scholarly research of the
problem (including my own research). The convention was never adopted,
however, because of political opposition in the United States by the second
Bush Administration, apparently based on philosophical dogma that free-

own impersonate him, thereby receiving the lottery money—which would be split evenly
among the residents. But one resident threatens to reveal the ruse to the authorities unless
she receives a disproportionately high share.
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market solutions always ought to trump legislative ones. They instead
favored solving the holdout problem contractually through what are referred
to as collective-action clauses, allowing essential payment terms of a loan
facility to be changed through super-majority, as opposed to unanimous,
voting.

There are, however, two fundamental problems with collective-action
clauses. First, collective-action clauses are not always included in sovereign
loan and bond agreements. In the Greek debt crisis, for example, 90 percent
of the total debt was not governed by collective-action clauses. Second, even
if every sovereign loan and bond agreement included collective-action
clauses, those clauses only work on an agreement-by-agreement basis.
Therefore, any one or more syndicate of banks or group of bondholders that
fails to achieve a super-majority vote would itself be a holdout vis-à-vis
other creditors. It therefore is unlikely that collective-action clauses can ever
effectively resolve the holdout problem in sovereign-debt restructuring.

I therefore believe that an international convention, in which supermajority voting can bind all of a nation‟s creditors, is needed to solve the
holdout problem.

Addressing the Funding Problem
Such a convention could also address the funding problem. A simple
remedy would be to grant a first priority right of repayment to loans of new
money made to enable a country to pay critical expenses during the debt
restructuring process. Existing creditors can be protected by giving them the
right to object to a new-money loan if its amount is too high or its terms are
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inappropriate. Existing creditors will also be further protected because a
country that abuses new-money lending privileges will be unlikely to receive
super-majority creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan.

Consensus and Disputes
Once these market failures have been addressed, the remainder of the
sovereign debt restructuring process can be consensual. A consensual
process would not undermine the rule of law, as would an attempt by a
nation to impose a “haircut” on its bonds such as by unilaterally reducing the
principal amount of the bonds or the rate of interest payable thereunder. Nor
should a consensual restructuring increase borrowing costs for other nations.
Indeed, a nation whose debt has been consensually restructured should itself
be able to borrow new money at attractive rates.

Nor would a sovereign debt restructuring process need to depend on
the creation of a “bankruptcy” court or other costly institutional arbiter.
Indeed, the experience of corporate debt restructuring in the United States
under Chapter 11 confirms that the parties themselves do most of the
negotiating. When parties cannot reach agreement on issues, a relatively
low-cost and straightforward procedure already exists under international
law for this purpose. The International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body created under the auspices of the
World Bank, provides facilities for arbitration of investment disputes. The
ICSID arbitration procedure is well established, commonly used, and widely
accepted, and it should be a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is
needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes.
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